Living at the Cutting Edge
Women’s Experiences of Protection Orders
Executive Summary
A report prepared by
Neville Robertson, Ruth Busch, Radha D’Souza, Fiona
Lam Sheung,
Reynu Anand, Roma Balzer, Ariana Simpson and Dulcie
Paina
of the University of Waikato (School of Law and the
Maori and Psychology Research Unit)
Commissioned by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs
August 2007
- On this page
- Dedication
- Acknowledgements
- About this report
- Executive Summary
Dedication
Dedicated to the 212 women and children
who have died in domestic violence homicides since
the enactment of the Domestic Violence Act 19951.
1995
Cherie Hoyle (29 years)
Chay Grant
Robert Grant (4 years)
Stephanie Skidmore (20 years)
Leonie Newman (26 years)
Victoria Watson (8 months)
Charmaine Julian (42 years)
Veronica Takerei-Mahu (11months)
Sara Nixon (7 years)
1997
Andrea Brander (52 years)
Child, name not known
Child, name not known
Shae Hammond (17 months)
Anaru Te Wheke Donny Te Moananui Rogers (17 months)
Rosemary Roberts (27 years)
Pet Kum Kee (49 years)
Brittany Crothall (3 years)
Jamoure Chaney (10 months)
Casey Albury (17 years)
Karen Jacobs (26 years)
Moana King (34 years)
Stephanie Baker (26 years)
Andrea Torrey (28 years)
Wynell Lelievre (15 years)
Catriona Fettes (33 years)
Tishena Valentine Crosland (2 years)
Peti Taihuka Cherie Kokiri (12 years)
Marcus Te Hira Grey (2 months)
Kim Ihaka (22 years)
Deidre Williams (22 years)
1998
Alofa Fasavalu (38 years)
Liam Sullivan (3 months)
Baby boy, name not known
Angelina Edwards (25 years)
Nivek Dodunski (17 months)
Karen Stanley-Hunt (25 years)
Fiona Maulolo (31 years)
Shona Bruce (42 years)
Jaydon Perrin (10 months)
Jonelle Tarawera (19 months)
Bavinder Kaur (26 years)
Lauren Runciman (19 years)
Margaret Bennellick (44 years)
Patricia Paniani (33 years)
Kelly Rae McRoberts (6 years)
Lisa Hurrell (21 years)
Lucy Carter (7 years)
Thomas Carter (4 years)
Holly Carter (3 years)
Pirimai Simmonds (17 months)
Jennifer Federici (27 years)
Lisa Hope (8 years)
1999
Marama Tamati (19 years)
James Whakaruru (4 years)
Simon Tokona (18 months)
Winiata Tokona (3 years)
Roimata Wehi (25 years)
Mereana Edmonds (6 years)
Angela Han
Nicholas Han (4 years)
Christina Han (2 years)
Joanne Van Duyvenbooden (32 years)
River Michael Manawatu-Wright (9 months)
Israel Aporo (3 years)
Jillian Thomas (45 years)
Elizabeth Douglas (51 years)
Keziah Te Huia Smith (11 months)
2000
Annette Bouwer (47 years)
Tangaroa Matiu (3 years)
Alice Perkins (8 years)
Maria Perkins (6 years)
Kamphet Vong Phak Dy (50 years)
Jian Huang (35 years)
Jiang Su
Alison Aris (32 years)
Te Miringa Tipene
Lilybing Hinewaoriki Karaitiana-Matiaha (23 months)
Natasha Tana-Bind (24 years)
Cherie Perkin (23 months)
Baby boy, name unknown (11 months)
Matekino Taylor (25 years)
Christine Lundy (38 years)
Amber Grace Lundy (7 years)
Florence Simpson (82 years)
Liotta Leuta (5 years)
Eliza May Te Hiko (45 years)
Margaret Waterhouse (42 years)
2001
Tracey Patmore (34 years)
Daniel Marshall Loveridge (13 months)
Lauren Shepherd (21 years)
Thomas Lance Darshay Schuman (2 years)
Levi Wright (10 months)
Caleb Moorhead (6 months)
Dominique Hingston (6 years)
Nikita Hingston (5 years)
Ryco Lance Mauri (10 months)
Patricia Burton (49 years)
Helen Wickliffe (22 years)
Te Pare (Polly) Te Kahu (39 years)
Chanel Lambert (21 years)
Karen Nant (16 years)
Janice Kenrick (40 years)
Pamela Hesketh (64 years)
Helen Johns (43 years)
Saliel Aplin (12 years)
Olympia Jetson (11 years)
Wathanak Tea (37 years)
Jaelyn Ariki Ngatai Maxwell (6 years)
2002
Wendy Heaysman (56 years)
Langaola Ahau (23 years)
Tamati Pokaia (3 years)
Barbara Miller (17 years)
Kalin St Michael (2 years)
Brodie Gordon (9 weeks)
Shontelle Marks (4 months)
Kelly Paula Gush (12 years)
Hasnah Hamer (38 years)
Dawn Parrish (65 years)
Coral-Ellen Burrows (6 years)
Cheyanne Rongonui (18 years)
Zhi Ping Yu (22 years)
Weng Di Dai (10 years)
Edwina Graham (30 years)
Jessica Pardoe
Iris Kathleen Davidson (23 months)
2003
Jia Ye (20 years)
Girl, name not known (11 years)
Boy, name not known (6 years)
Bin Lin (Ruby)
Anahera Ross Lewis (3 years)
Randwick Aholelei (3 months)
Caleb Tribble (4 months)
Donna Hewlett (39 years)
Seau Luana Ate (51 years)
Gulshad Hussein (23 years)
Lorraine Royal (43 years)
Lisa Blackmore (27 years)
Rocky Wano (15 years)
2004
Ordette Lloyd-Rangiuia (45 years)
Gabriel Harrison-Taylor (8 months)
Asolelei Samuelu (32 years)
Child, name not known
Child, name not known
Raiden Niania(4 months)
Wendy Mercer (34 years)
Will Mercer (6 months)
Pamela Lotze (48 years)
Baby, name not known (4 months)
Te Hau Te Horo O’Carroll (10 years)
Ngamata O’Carroll (2 years)
Molly Rose McRae (6 years)
Cheryl Pareanga (33 years)
Baby girl, name unknown (7 months)
Cameron Fielding (10 years)
Kathleen Harris (7 months)
Krystal Fielding (8 years)
Mereana Clemments-Matete (14 months)
2005
Denise Holmes (27 years)
Baby boy, name unknown (6 days)
Sarah Rebekah Haddock-Woodcock (3 months)
Chitralekha Ramakrishnan (32 years)
Woman, name not known (36 years)
Susanna Brown (33 years)
Hannoraugh Johansen (94 years)
Nicola Hackell (36 years)
Britney Angelique Abbott (9 years)
Eileen Te Oki Puke
Aaliya Morrissey (2 years)
Nancy Peterson (Xiukun Feng) (54 years)
Rosemary Harry (33 years)
Shunlian Huang (24 years)
Christine Hindson (45 years)
Catherine Carter (45 years)
Thelma Thompson (26 years)
Woman, name not known (20 years)
Deborah Rerekura (39 years)
Moana Kapua (29 years)
Samantha Mahara-Rangiawha (34 years)
Teresa Kohu (27 years)
Karen Oakes (28 years)
2006
Ruth Peoples (35 years)
Ngatikaura Ngati (3 years)
Staranise Waru (7 months)
Woman, name not known (34 years)
Arwen Fletcher (2 years)
Suzanne McSweeney (50 years)
Baby girl, name not known (14 months)
Boy, name not known (3 years)
Woman, name not known (22 years)
Mairina Dunn (17 years)
Ariana Burgess (24 years)
Veralyn Koia (41 years)
Lesa Pakau (33 years)
Denise Brame (41 years)
Chris Kahui (3 months)
Cru Kahui (3 months)
Maureen Matete-Walker (36 years)
Alyssa Patricia Little-Murphy (7 months)
Aiden Whitfield (15 years)
Alex McRae (2 years)
Baby girl, name not known (newborn)
Woman, name not known (46 years)
Reipai Joanne Dobson (19 years)
2007
Shirley Anne Keith (62 years)
Denise Simeon (52 years)
Angela Teresa Dean (55 years)
Misook Kim (42 years)
Baby girl, name not known (18 months)
Babt girl, name not known (newborn)
Woman , name not known (35 years)
Rosslene White (35 years)
Judge Ellis, in Fielder v Hubbard, the very first
case that was decided under section 16B(4) of the
Guardianship Act, stated:
It may be that this [is] the first such
defended case in the Family Court requiring consideration
of the provisions of this amendment, and if that
is so, it would be appropriate, since it was in this
Court that orders were made affecting the children
of the Bristol family whose tragic fate subsequently
gave rise to the Commission of Inquiry whose recommendation
led to this significant legislative change. It might
have been expected that the significance of the event,
and of the legislative change, would have made more
impression on counsel in this case, some of whom
were involved in that other.” [1996] NZFLR 769
LEST WE FORGET
Acknowledgements
This research was commissioned by the Ministry of
Women’s Affairs. It was completed only with the help
of many people whose assistance we acknowledge.
• The women who generously and bravely gave
of their time and energy to tell their stories.
• The key informants who took time to share
their wisdom with us.
• Margaret Young and Rowena Phair of the Ministry
of Women’s Affairs for their patience, support and
meticulous work in checking our report.
• Ged Byers, Rob Veale, Jodine Lee and Ari Pfeiffenberger
of the Office of the Commissioner of Police for facilitating
access to police documents.
• Elizabeth Barrett and Patricia Knaggs of the
Ministry of Justice for supplying statistical and
other information.
• Karen Whiteman who did much of the administrative
work during the early part of the project.
• The Family Violence Technical Advisory Unit
for providing office space, ideas and lunches.
• Our respective whanau who have supported us
through the past two years.
About this report
This report was commissioned by the Ministry of
Women’s Affairs. The views expressed in it are those
of the authors and not necessarily those of the Ministry.
The full report is published in two volumes:
Volume 1: The Women’s Stories (Chapters
1 – 6)
Volume 2: What's To Be Done? A Critical Analysis
of Statutory and Practice Approaches to Domestic
Violence (Chapters 7 – 15 and Appendices)
Executive Summary
Background
This study was commissioned by the Ministry of Women’s
Affairs, some ten years after the implementation of
the Domestic Violence Act. Our objectives were to:
- identify and describe the experiences of a sample
of women in obtaining protection orders, the impact
of protection orders and the response to breaches
of protection orders
- identify those aspects that are working well
(i.e. positive experiences of protection orders)
- identify areas for improvement including barriers
that prevent women from applying for and obtaining
protection orders.
Our approach
At the heart of our research are 43 case studies of
women and their inexperiences of domestic violence
and seeking safety. The case studies are presented
in four streams: Maori women, Pakeha women, Pasifika
women and other ethnic minority women. In addition
to this cultural diversity, women were recruited to
ensure that a diversity of experiences were included
in our sample (including women who did not apply for
protection orders).
We have drawn on four other mains sources of information.
- Interviews with key informants. That is, family
law practitioners, women’s advocates, stopping
violence workers, Ministry of Justice personnel,
social workers and community workers.
- Decisions of the Family Court and criminal courts
relating to domestic violence, including applications
for protection orders and prosecutions for breaching
such orders – as well as relevant decisions of
the Residence Review Board.
- Statistical information relating to applications
for protection orders.
- Social science and legal research on domestic
violence.
Key Findings
The stated object of the Domestic Violence Act 1995,
as spelt out in section 5(1), is:
… to reduce and prevent violence in domestic
relationships by—
- Recognising that domestic violence, in all
its forms, is unacceptable behaviour; and
- Ensuring that, where domestic violence occurs,
there is effective legal protection for its victims.
Significantly, Parliament underlined the importance
of the object of the Act in section 5(3).
- Any Court which, or any person who, exercises
any power conferred by or under this Act must
be guided in the exercise of that power by the
object specified in subsection (1) of this section.
Our key informants were almost unanimous that the Domestic
Violence Act 1995, and the concurrent amendments made
to the Guardianship Act 1968, were – and are – sound
legislation. However, repeatedly, in our conversations
with them, key informants expressed frustration at
various aspects of the implementation of the legislation.
Their comments were borne out in the case studies,
in our analysis of decided cases, and in our analysis
of the limited statistical information available.
Applying for Protection Orders
While many women were aware of protection orders,
some groups of women, particularly new migrants,
seemed to know little about them. Often, women learned
about orders when they called the police, either
from the police officers who attended the scene or
from women’s advocates who were called or visited
following the police attendance. Referral protocols
– whereby Women’s Refuges or other advocacy organisations
provide follow-up support to women who call the police
– seem to be widely implemented. Such follow-up was
appreciated by the women in our case studies.
Besides a lack of information, other barriers to
making an application for a protection order included
those factors which tend to mitigate against battered
women leaving abusive relationships: fear of the
abuser’s payback, poverty, shame and, in some cases,
community condemnation. For women ineligible for
legal aid, cost was a significant barrier. For non-resident
women whose abusers were also the sponsors of their
applications for residence, applying for a protection
orders was generally not an option; the threat of
removal and the possibility of permanent separation
from their children made calling the police or obtaining
a protection order virtually impossible. Some women
did not apply for orders, or applied reluctantly,
because they believed that protection orders were
ineffective. On the other hand, encouragement to
apply came from refuge workers, Victim Support workers,
the Citizens Advice Bureau and, for some women, friends
and family.
Most women were able to access legal advice, often
through the sources just mentioned. Lawyers were
generally perceived as being helpful, especially
in explaining protection orders to women. However,
our case studies do include examples of poor legal
advocacy, including lawyers who recommended abandoning
applications.
Thirty-two of the 43 women in our case studies applied
for a protection order at least once (some applied
twice or more). All of these women applied without
notice to the respondent. Twenty-eight were granted
a temporary protection order. Of the four applications
which were put on notice, only one woman obtained
a final protection order. These figures broadly match
national statistics. Significantly, the Pasifika
and other ethnic minority women in our case studies
were much less likely to apply for, and obtain, protection
orders than the Maori and Pakeha women.
Key informants told us that, over the past few years,
the threshold for granting protection orders without
notice to the respondent has been raised. Judicial
speeches tend to reinforce this view, as does our
analysis of decided cases and of published statistics.
We can discern no compelling legal reasons for the
barrier for obtaining temporary protection orders
being raised and current judicial practice seems
counter to the object of the Domestic Violence Act
1995, especially section 5(3). Certainly, the women
whose applications were put on notice experienced
significant hardship as a result.
It is important to understand that without notice
applications for protection orders are routinely
considered “on the papers”. Neither women nor their
solicitors are heard in person. Moreover, the failure
of some judges to give reasons for declining applications
or for putting them on notice raises real concerns
for the rights of women to natural justice. Unless
reasons are given, the appeals process becomes a
catch-22 situation. It is difficult for the appellant
battered women to show that the Family Court judge
has incorrectly exercised his or her discretion or
misapplied the law when the judge is not required
to give reasons for his or her decision.
Women in our study whose applications were opposed
in a defended hearing found such experiences traumatic
and re-victimising.
Breaches of Protection Orders
While getting a protection order was a psychological
boost for most women, any relief was, in the majority
of cases, shortlived. That is, most women experienced
multiple and repetitive breaches of their orders. In
some cases, respondents embarked on sustained campaigns
of stalking and harassment. Some of this was by electronic
means. Telephone calls, text messages and emails were
all used to harass, threaten and intimidate women in
breach of protection orders. Seldom were men subject
to any meaningful consequences for such breaches.
Indeed, the same could be said about breaches generally.
That is, the women in our case studies often experienced
a quite inadequate response from the police when they
reported breaches of their protection order. This was
particularly the case with breaches of the non-contact
provisions which did not involve physical assaults.
Such breaches were often trivialised as “technical”,
but to the women involved they were frightening and
worrying reminders of the respondent’s ability to track
them down. Often, such breaches triggered flashbacks
and other symptoms of post-traumatic stress. On the
other hand, some women did have some success in getting
their orders enforced. Generally, this required them
to be incredibly persistent in documenting events and
in calling the police to ask about the progress of
their complaint. Other examples of effective police
action seemed to reflect the understanding and commitment
of particular officers, especially police family violence
coordinators. Overall, police enforcement of protection
orders was inconsistent. In many respects, whether
a woman received an effective response or not depended
on the luck of the draw.
Inadequate enforcement of protection orders extended
to the criminal courts. Few men who breached their
orders were ever convicted of such offences, and even
fewer received a meaningful sentence. If the accused
was charged with an assault and a breach, the result
was often a concurrent sentence. Indeed, in one of
our cases, the sentence for a conviction of threatening
to kill, male assaults female and possession of a dangerous
weapon resulted in a concurrent sentence of 180 hours
for the accused. In our case studies, very little emphasis
appeared to be placed on enhancing the safety of the
woman. Again, the experiences revealed in our case
studies broadly reflect published statistics about
the clearance, prosecution and sentencing of breaches
of protection orders. Moreover, for women who had to
give evidence in the criminal courts in relation to
breaches, participation in the prosecution of the respondent
was often another point of exposure to his psychological
violence.
It should be noted that having a protection order granted
does not mean it remains in place, as eight of the
women who got orders discovered. In two cases, respondents
successfully opposed the granting of a final order
(and this may yet happen to a third women who is awaiting
her hearing). In four cases, temporary orders were
discharged after intimidation and pressure from their
abuser led to the women abandoning their applications
for a final order. In two cases, men successfully applied
to have final orders discharged, even though in both
cases there had been numerous breaches of those orders.
Children and Domestic Violence
As is clear from our case studies, children are
frequently exposed to domestic violence, either as
witnesses to the violence against their mother, as
unintended direct victims (as can happen when children
attempt to protect their mother or when their mother
is carrying them when she is attacked), or as the
intended direct victims. The social science literature
provides convincing evidence of the deleterious effects
of such exposure. The batterer parent poses significant
risks to his children before and after separation.
Unless it is carefully monitored – and sometimes,
even if it is – contact with such a parent can seriously
undermine a child’s healing from exposure to violence.
In the words of the English Court of Appeal in Re
L,2 “domestic violence represents
a total failure of parenting on the part of the abuser.”
As the case studies show, women with children negotiate
their own safety within the context of their fears
for their children. Sometimes, concerns about their
children precipitated separation. On the other hand,
some women remained in the relationship, or reconciled
with the abuser, because doing so meant that they
were better able to protect their children.
Post-separation, the Family Court became an arena
of perpetrators’ power and control tactics. That
is, they engaged in protracted litigation under the
Care of Children Act 2004 as they sought various
orders: orders giving them the day-to-day care of
the children; orders giving them unsupervised contact
with the children; orders preventing the removal
of the children from a specific place within New
Zealand or to another country; and orders preventing
women who had day-to-day care from relocating back
to their families and other support systems. Such
litigation was draining, frustrating, frightening
and expensive for women. Often it meant that their
plans for their children, new relationships or new
jobs were significantly impeded. Moreover, the Family
Court’s preference for mediation and conciliation
processes in resolving parenting disputes meant that
some of the women were bullied into accepting unsafe
or unnecessarily burdensome “consent” orders regarding
their children.
Overall, the experiences of the women in our case
studies tended to confirm what many key informants
told us: despite the provisions of the Domestic Violence
Act 1995 and sections 58 to 61 of the Care of Children
Act 2004, ongoing contact with an abusive father
trumps safety for women and children.
Immigration Issues
Immigrant women faced particular barriers. Sometimes
these involved language difficulties. The lack of interpreters
and/or the lack of patience demonstrated by some officials
meant that women with little or heavily accented English
fared particularly badly in their interactions with
police officers, judges, counsellors and other service
providers. For some women, migration meant that features
of their cultures which were protective of women had
been lost. Instead, community condemnation and feelings
of shame proved to be significant barriers to their
safety and autonomy. Non-resident women whose batterer
was also the sponsor of their application for residence
were in a particularly vulnerable position. In the
worst cases, such men rescinded their sponsorship of
the residence application and, at the same time, got
an order from the Family Court preventing removal of
the child(ren) from the country. Under exactly these
circumstances, one of our case study participants has
been removed from the country, leaving her daughter
in the care of the father. The same may yet happen
to another of our participants.
Other Agencies
Of the other services women used, the most positively
evaluated were women’s refuges and protected persons
programmes. The former provided immediate physical
safety for some women, and advice, support and advocacy
for a much larger group of women. Protected persons
programmes were highly valued by those women who attended
for the information and support they provided. Above
all, such programmes assured women that they were not
alone and nor were they stupid, thus directly countering
the isolation and emotional abuse tactics typical of
domestic violence perpetrators.
Women’s experiences of other groups, agencies and
organisations were more mixed. Some women found family
and whanau incredibly supportive. For other women,
family and whanau tended to collude with the abuser.
Similarly, women who belonged to religious communities
sometimes found themselves blamed for what had happened
to them. The role of Child, Youth and Family (CYF)
in the lives of some of our case study participants
was deeply problematic. Fear of losing their children
acted as a significant barrier to some women accessing
“official” help.
Finally, women’s experiences of their partner or
ex-partner attending a stopping violence programme
was generally negative. Few men completed such programmes,
and those who did not seemed to have escaped any
consequences for such failure.
Recommendations
In the following pages we have listed our recommendations.
Each is accompanied by a brief explanation. In addition,
there are references to the chapter of the main report
from which the recommendation is drawn. Readers who
wish to understand the full rationale for the recommendation
should read the chapters listed.
Amendments to Relevant Legislation
The problems summarised above suggest that the Domestic
Violence Act 1995 has failed to realise its promise.
Yet even the most critical of our key informants
had few problems with the Act as it is written. Overwhelmingly,
the problems identified in our case studies and in
our analyses of judicial decisions reflect not inadequate
legislation but inadequate implementation. This is
particularly evident in the decisions of certain
Family Court judges who have, for example, failed
to carry out the risk assessment mandated by section
61 of the Care of Children Act 2004, or who have
added an extra “gloss” to the criteria for granting
without notice protection orders (based on a very
problematic view of section 27(1) of the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990) to impose a higher threshold
than Parliament intended. As we have commented at
several points in the following pages, such decision
makers need to implement the law as it is written,
not as they wish it were written. In many ways, our
most important message is enforce the law.
On the other hand, our findings have highlighted
a small number of areas in which both the Domestic
Violence Act 1995 and the Care of Children Act 2004
should be amended. These are outlined below.
- THAT section 13 of the Domestic Violence Act
1995 be amended to the effect that a without notice
application for a protection order may not be declined
or placed on notice unless the applicant and her
lawyer have had an opportunity to participate in
an (ex parte to the respondent) hearing, in the
court in which the application was filed, to address
any questions which might have led the judge to
decline the application or put it on notice.
- THAT section 13 of the Domestic Violence Act
1995 be further amended to require Family Court
judges to give reasons (in writing) when they either
decline or put on notice a section 13 application
for a temporary protection order.
It is standard practice that without notice applications
for protection orders are considered “on the papers”.
That is, there is no hearing. Instead, applications
are put before a duty judge who, typically, considers
them during a tea break or after other business has
been completed for the day. While this may be administratively
efficient for dealing with the volume of section
13 applications, applicants are denied natural justice
through the current practice. They are also denied
natural justice when the Family Court gives no reasons
for declining such applications or putting them on
notice. As the “loser” in the proceedings, the applicant
has a right to know why her application for a temporary
protection order has not been granted. Our proposed
amendments would remedy these problems. (Chapter
9.)
- THAT section 47 of the Domestic Violence Act
1995 be amended to prevent the court from discharging
a protection order without first being satisfied
that the protected person and any child of the
protected person will be safe from all forms of
the respondent’s violence.
As our case studies show, some women are pressured
into seeking the discharge of their protection order.
This has implications not only for them but also
their children. Our proposed amendment would help
protect applicants and their children in these circumstances.
(Chapter 8.)
- THAT section 50(2) of the Domestic Violence Act
1995 be repealed and replaced by a provision that,
unless there are special circumstances, police
shall arrest where there is cause to suspect that
the respondent has committed a breach of a protection
order.
As we understand it, section 50(2) was inserted
in the Act to encourage police officers to arrest
respondents who have breached their protection order.
In fact, following Police v Keenan,3 it
has become an impediment to making arrests. Certainly,
our case studies suggest that too often police fail
to make arrests when breaches of protection orders
are reported. (Chapter 12.)
- THAT section 58 of the Care of Children Act 2004,
be amended by adding “psychological violence” to
the types of violence which trigger the rebuttal
assumption that a violent party should not have
a role in providing the day-to-day care of a child
or have unsupervised contact with a child unless
the court is satisfied that the child will be safe.
As it stands, the rebuttal assumption is triggered
only by violence of a physical or sexual nature.
Our case studies confirm findings from the social
science literature that psychological violence also
has deleterious effects on children. The suggested
amendment would make section 58 of the Care of Children
Act 2004 consistent with the definition of domestic
violence provided in section 3(3) of the Domestic
Violence Act 1995 and also consistent with section
5(e) of the Care of Children Act and section 19 of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. (Chapter 11.)
- THAT the Care of Children Act 2004 be amended
to the effect that, where allegations of domestic
violence have been made in parenting order proceedings,
no consent parenting orders be made unless the
Family Court judge first scrutinises the proposed
consent order and satisfies himself or herself
that the particular parenting order is in the best
interests of the child(ren). The impact and effects
of the violence on the child(ren) must be evaluated
and the court must be satisfied that the physical,
sexual and psychological safety of the child(ren)
will be ensured during any day-to-day parenting
and/or contact arrangements.
The case studies illustrate how women can be bullied
into consenting to unsafe parenting and/or contact
arrangements. Our proposed amendment would require
that such consent orders not be accepted at face
value but subjected to proper risk assessment. (Chapter
10.)
- THAT section 4 of the Care of Children Act 2004
be amended to the effect that, where a party has
used violence against the other party or a child
of the other party (as defined by section 3(2)
of the Domestic Violence Act 1995), the court must,
in determining what best serves the child’s welfare
and best interests, take into account any wish
of the other party to relocate so that she or he
is able to recover from the trauma of violence
and to better provide an environment which will
support the recovery of the child.
As several of our case studies show, perpetrators
of domestic violence sometimes seek orders preventing
their ex-partners from relocating. We prefer the
position taken by Justice Fisher in M v M4 to
allow a parent who has been the target of domestic
violence to relocate. (Chapter 11.)
- THAT the Care of Children Act 2004 be amended
to the effect that unsupervised contact with a
party who has used violence (as defined by section
3(2) of the Domestic Violence Act 1995) against
the other party or a child of the other party,
shall not be granted unless the court has first
considered a report from a psychologist who has
specialist training in domestic violence. Such
a report shall evaluate the risk to the child,
the impact of the prior violence on the child,
the implications of the violence on each party’s
parenting abilities, and the meaning of the child’s
expressed wishes.
Some of the key informants we interviewed were concerned
that the Family Court was not always calling for
specialist reports when such reports were, in their
view, needed. Specialist knowledge is required in
assessing children exposed to domestic violence and
understanding their expressed wishes. (Chapter 11.
See also Chapter 7.)
- THAT the Family Proceedings Act 1980 be amended
to empower judges considering applications under
the Care of Children Act 2004 to direct that the
parties not be referred for counselling or to a
mediation conference:
- when a party has used violence (as defined
by section 3(2) of the Domestic Violence Act
1995) against the other party or a child of
the marriage or civil union or de facto relationship;
or
- if because of previous counselling or mediation
within the past 12 months, counselling or mediation
is unlikely to serve a useful purpose; or
- for any other reason.
- THAT the Family Proceedings Act 1980 be further
amended to specifically exclude victims of domestic
violence (as defined by section 3(2) of the Domestic
Violence Act 1995) from being required to take
part in counselling.
There is a strong consensus in the social science
literature that mediation and conciliation processes
are inappropriate in cases of domestic violence.
Our case studies include instances in which battered
women were bullied into consenting to potentially
unsafe and/or unnecessarily burdensome parenting
or contact arrangements, and other cases in which
the batterer used applications for parenting orders
or contact to further harass his ex-partner. Section
19A of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 specifies
that no one can be required to attend
counselling at which the other party is present if
that party has used domestic violence (as defined
in section 3(2) of the Domestic Violence Act 1995).
This provision needs to be broadened to include mediation
conferences as well as counselling. It would also
be useful for judges to have specific power to direct
that referrals to counselling not be made in response
to requests from a party who has used domestic violence
and/or who is unduly litigious. (Chapter 10.)
- THAT sections 103 to 106 of the Evidence Act
2006 be implemented immediately so that victims
of domestic violence are able to give their evidence
while screened from the accused or via video.
The case studies include various examples of the
intimidation to which victim witnesses can be exposed
while testifying in Court. This can be addressed
by the use of screens or video technology. The Evidence
Act 2006, the implementation of which awaits an Order
in Council,5 contains excellent provisions
for alternative ways of giving evidence. We think
the Executive Council should exercise its powers
under section 2 of the Act to set an immediate commencement
date for these provisions (set out in sections 103
to 106). (Chapter 13.)
The Family and District Courts
- THAT specialist domestic violence victim advocacy
be provided for victims of domestic violence within
both the criminal and family jurisdictions. This
should be a free service provided by approved community-based
domestic violence services, with advocates having
speaking rights in court. Advocates should be available
to assist victims of domestic violence by:
- helping women file applications for protection
orders;
- explaining protection orders and their enforcement;
- helping women make safety plans;
- encouraging women to attend protected persons
programmes;
- preparing women for any hearings in both
the criminal and family courts, as well as
any mediation which may be part of proceedings
under the Care of Children Act 2004, and supporting
them through such hearings and mediation;
- advising non-resident women about the Victims
of Domestic Violence Policy; and
- helping women access other relevant services.
The case studies include many examples of women
lacking good information about protection orders
or about the special residence policy for victims
of domestic violence. Women sometimes did not fully
understand the protection order and were unsure about
how to have it enforced. Some women were intimidated
at court, and felt vulnerable and silenced. The cost
of legal fees for some women who were ineligible
for legal aid was a barrier to applying for a protection
order. All of these issues could be addressed by
specialist domestic violence advocates, who, in addition
to providing a service to individual women, could
take part in the sort of safety audits and monitoring
we recommend elsewhere. Importantly, to be effective,
such advocates need to be independent of the Ministry
of Justice. We think that the sort of service we
are recommending here would go some way to making
the courts victim friendly. (Chapter 8. See also
Chapter 13.)
- THAT the Ministry of Justice ensure that all
professionals (for example, judges, counsel for
the child, specialist report writers, mediators,
counsellors and supervised access providers) working
in the Family Court and specialist domestic violence
criminal courts be required to demonstrate a multidisciplinary
understanding of domestic violence, including the
principles of scientifically rigorous risk assessment,
prior to their appointment, and that they be required
to participate in annual “refresher” training on
these matters.
Here, we are following the call of Lord Justice
Nicholas Wall for judges and other professionals
working in the Family Court to be well trained –
and to maintain their training at an appropriate
level. Many of the problems we have identified –
the raising of the threshold for granting without
notice protection orders, making dangerous parenting
orders, misinterpreting children’s wishes in the
context of domestic violence, minimising the impact
of psychological violence, being overly optimistic
about men’s commitment to change, minimising the
risks a battering parent presents to his children
and to their recovery from the trauma of violence,
using a discredited typology of domestic violence
– each of these is reflective of significant ignorance
of recent research and good practice standards in
the field. (Chapter 11. See also Chapters 8, 9 and
10.)
- THAT the Family Court follows the practice of
allowing affidavits in support of applications
for temporary protection orders to be amended to
omit information which might identify the applicant’s
whereabouts or endanger the applicant, the children
of the relationship, or any other person supporting
the applicant.
The case studies include instances in which women
had well-founded fears that information included
in their affidavits could compromise their safety.
Here, our recommendation endorses the procedure adopted
by the Family Court judge in Trudy’s case study.
(Chapter 8.)
- THAT a counsellor who receives any referral from
the Family Court to conduct counselling shall screen
for the occurrence of domestic or family violence
between the parties. Where evidence of domestic
violence exists, mediation shall occur only if:
- counselling is requested by the victim of
the violence;
- counselling is provided by a counsellor who
is trained in domestic violence and able to
protect the safety of the victim; and
- at any counselling session with the perpetrator,
the victim is permitted to have in attendance
a support person of her choice (including a
lawyer) who may advocate on her behalf.
Recommendations 9 and 10 call for amendments to
the Family Proceedings Act 1980 to give judges the
power to order that referrals to counselling and
mediation not be made in cases of domestic violence
and to ensure that identified victims of domestic
violence are not required to attend mediation. Because
domestic violence is not always identified at the
outset, for this general approach to be fully implemented,
those amendments need to be accompanied by routine
screening for domestic violence and the implementation
of appropriate safety and empowerment measures when
it is identified. (Chapter 10.)
- THAT, in cases involving an inquiry under section
60 Care of Children Act 2004, a psychologist who
has specialist training in domestic violence should
be appointed to evaluate the risk to the child,
the impact of the prior violence on the child,
the implications of the violence on each party’s
parenting abilities, and the meaning of the child’s
expressed wishes.
As the cases of Amira and Amy show, the risk assessment
mandated in section 60 of the Care of Children Act
will not be effective unless judges have good quality
information on which to base their inquiry. A report
from a suitably trained psychologist would have allowed
the Court to conduct a proper assessment of the risk
to the relevant children. However, in what we were
told is an increasingly common pattern, in neither
case was such a report requested. Obtaining such
reports should be standard practice where there is
domestic violence. (Chapter 11).
- THAT the Parenting Hearings Programme Pilot deal
only with cases in which both parties have freely
consented to take part. Moreover, sufficient time
periods and resources need to be available for
specialist reports to be obtained and the mandatory
approach specified in sections 60 and 61 of the
Care of Children Act 2004 to be carried out.
We think that the emphasis on speedy resolution
in the Parenting Hearings Programme Pilot will not
serve battered women and their children well. There
is no evidence that children are adversely affected
by the short- or even medium-term loss of their relationship
with a violent parent, providing they have the support
and security of the uninterrupted care of their non-violent
parent. Speed must not compromise safety. (Chapter
11.)
- THAT the Ministry of Justice reviews information
systems to ensure that:
- judges in the criminal court considering
sentences in domestic violence cases can access
relevant records of proceedings in the Family
Court (including applications for a protection
order, affidavits in support, and judges’ decisions
and memoranda);
- judges in the Family Court considering applications
under the Domestic Violence Act 1995 and the
Care of Children Act 2004 can access records
of domestic violence offences from the criminal
courts and POL400 forms from the police;
- judges in one Family Court registry can access
records relating to matters involving the parties
in other registries; and
- the records referred to above are retrievable
under the name of each party and each child.
At the moment, breaches of protection order being
heard in the criminal court are typically dealt with
without reference to the background of the case.
In these circumstances, breaches of the non-contact
provisions of a protection order in which there is
no physical assault can, for example, be seen as
relatively minor and/or of a merely “technical” nature.
The case studies include examples of minimal sentences
being imposed for such breaches of protection orders.
The sort of information sharing we are proposing
will allow breaches to be placed in context by criminal
court judges, and for Family Court judges to know
about relevant criminal court cases when considering
applications for protection orders and/or parenting
orders. They will also prevent the Family Court from
effectively being put in the position of countermanding
itself as can happen when a judge makes an order
in one registry without knowing that an order has
already been made in respect of the same case in
another registry. (Chapter 13. See also Chapter 11.)
- THAT no more specialist domestic violence courts
be established until the present courts have been
properly evaluated to identify both good and problematic
practices.
Interviews with key informants, our analysis of
judicial speeches and articles, and our review of
relevant literature raise serious questions about
the safety of such courts for victims and their effectiveness
in holding perpetrators accountable for their violence.
They should not be replicated without proper evaluation.
(Chapter 13.)
- THAT the Ministry of Justice ensures information
about the Domestic Violence Act 1995 and protection
orders, including how to apply for them and how
to have them enforced, is translated into the various
languages common in New Zealand, makes that information
available on its website and disseminates that
information widely through community networks.
- THAT a plain-English order be developed.
The Ministry of Justice has produced guides to the
Care of Children Act 2004 in 14 languages (including
Maori and English). A similar approach is needed
in relation to protection orders. The case studies
and the social science literature show that non-English-speaking
women are particularly ill-informed about their legal
options. However, understanding protection orders
is not simply a case of which language it is written
in, but also of the style in which it is written.
The section 19(2) (non-contact) provisions are particularly
wordy and complex. A plain language order is needed.
(Chapter 8. See also Chapter 15.)
- THAT the Family Court encourages counsellors
from across the wide range of linguistic and cultural
communities within New Zealand to become accredited
so that culturally appropriate counselling can
be provided as frequently as possible, and that
it ensures that interpreters are available to assist
parties in court who have limited facility with
English.
The case studies reveal what seem to be racist and
monocultural practices which have had serious impacts
on women and their children. In what might be regarded
as the worst case of its type, one of our participants
has been removed from the country, leaving her daughter
in the care of her violent (and probably sexually
abusive) New Zealand resident father. (Chapter 8.)
- THAT the Ministry of Justice commissions periodic
evaluations to assess the extent to which decision
making regarding applications for protection orders
and parenting orders contributes to the Domestic
Violence Act 1995’s goal of providing effective
protection to victims of domestic violence and
their children.
A perennial problem in the Family Court is that
judges get feedback on their decisions only when
they are appealed or when a party comes back to court
with a new application. Typically, they do not learn
whether the parenting orders they have put in place
have helped to create an environment in which children
can heal from trauma or if those children have been
re-victimised. Similarly, except for the possible
exception where an unsuccessful applicant has been
murdered, judges do not know what further violence
women have experienced when an application for a
protection order has been declined or put on notice.
The lack of such feedback increases the risk of dangerous
decision making. (Chapter 11. See also Chapters 7
and 8.)
Family Law Practitioners
- THAT family law practitioners not recommend undertakings
in situations where there is a potential for future
physical, sexual, or psychological violence.
Perpetrators of domestic violence sometimes succeed
in having an application for a protection order withdrawn
in exchange for an undertaking to leave the applicant
alone. Such undertakings are unenforceable and, because
they may give the appearance of safety, may make
things worse for women. (Chapter 15. See also Chapters
8 and 9.)
Legal Services Agency
- THAT the eligibility criteria for legal aid be
revised so that all bona fide applications for
protection orders are free.
Violence against women is a fundamental breach of
women’s human rights. The state has a responsibility
to make effective remedies accessible. At the moment,
cost is a barrier to obtaining a protection order
for those women who are not eligible for legal aid.
(Chapter 8.)
- THAT fee ceilings for legally aided temporary
protection order applications and other Domestic
Violence Act 1995 proceedings be increased so that
senior family law practitioners can be encouraged
to accept this type of work.
Consistently, key informants told us that Domestic
Violence Act 1995 work was uneconomic for any but
the most junior of legal practitioners. This needs
to change. (Chapter 8.)
- THAT legal aid should be available to women who
wish to appeal against decisions of Immigration
New Zealand under the Victims of Domestic Violence
Policy. Additionally, or alternatively, this work
could become one of the roles of the free domestic
violence victim advocacy services we have recommended.
As the successful appeal cited in Chapter 14 shows,
appeals against decisions of Immigration New Zealand
are an important and potentially vital protection
of the rights of non-resident women who are victims
of domestic violence. Almost by definition, such
women are unlikely to be able to afford the legal
fees involved in making an appeal. Our recommendation
will help protect their rights to natural justice.
(Chapter 14.)
Domestic Violence Act Programmes
- THAT the Ministry of Justice works with relevant
community organisations to ensure linguistically
and culturally appropriate protected persons and
respondents programmes are available for diverse
groups, and that these be actively promoted in
appropriate ways.
Protected persons programmes are one of the unquestioned
successes of the Domestic Violence Act 1995. Those
women in our case studies who participated in a protected
persons programmes found them to be extremely helpful.
The programmes were well regarded by the key informants
we spoke to. However, only about a third of those
eligible attend such programmes, and there is a lack
of programmes, particularly group programmes, specifically
for Pasifika and other ethnic minority women. The
value of respondents programmes is somewhat contested
but we agree with our key informants and the dominant
view of the social science literature that such programmes,
properly implemented as part of a comprehensive approach
to battering, can make a useful contribution. As
with protected persons programmes, there are few
respondents programmes which cater adequately for
other than Maori and Pakeha men. (Chapter 15. See
also Chapter 14.)
- THAT much higher priority be placed on prosecuting
non-attendance at respondents programmes, that
the procedure be streamlined, and that statistics
for programme completion and enforcement action
taken be routinely collated and published.
One of the main values of respondents programmes
is the message they deliver about the unacceptability
of violence. That message is seriously undermined
if attendance is not enforced. According to key informants
working in stopping violence programmes, men who
are directed to programmes but fail to complete them
rarely face any consequences for their non-completion.
Unfortunately, we could find no recent published
statistics to verify this, but what key informants
told us was reflected in our case studies. Of the
28 women who got a protection order, only one reported
that the respondent had completed his programme,
although two more were still attending at the time
of our interviews. As far as we can tell, none of
the men faced any consequences for failing to complete
a programme as directed. (Chapter 15.)
- THAT protocols be developed so that providers
of respondents programmes are routinely given names
and contact details of protected persons to facilitate
victim contact.
As the social science literature shows, providing
stopping violence programmes for men can be dangerous.
Some men use programme participation to bargain their
way back into the relationship. Empirical studies
show that women are more likely to remain in their
relationship if their partner enters a programme.
Some men make self-serving comparisons with other
programme participants in an effort to portray themselves
to their partners as not being so bad. Some men appropriate
the language of the programme to further abuse and
manipulate their partners. Such risks can be minimised
if partners are provided with advocacy, support and
realistic information about the effectiveness of
programmes and if their safety is monitored. Unfortunately,
programme providers have told us that making contact
with the partners of programme participants is becoming
increasingly difficult because the Family Court will
not pass on contact details. Some providers reported
being told explicitly that they are not to contact
partners. This is quite contrary to recognised good
practice and may in fact mean that some programmes
are doing more harm than good. (Chapter 15.)
The New Zealand Police
- THAT the New Zealand Police Family Violence Policy
be revised to:
- incorporate a predominant aggressor test
in relation to arrest;
- include a specific direction that the victim
is not to be placed in the position of having
to decide whether the offender is to be charged
and/or arrested;
- reflect a presumption that victims will not
be able to participate in prosecutions, and
that prosecution without victim participation
be used whenever possible;
- emphasise investigative practices which will
support the more effective prosecution of offenders,
including collecting and presenting evidence
which demonstrates the full extent and impact
of violence; and
- reflect the provisions of the Bail Act 2000
to incorporate a presumption against the granting
of police bail to any domestic violence offender,
and a specific direction that any offender
released on police bail be subject to a non-association
condition in respect of the victim.
The current police Family Violence Policy is over
ten years old and needs to be revised in the light
of experience. As the literature – and our case studies
show – women who use violence in self-defence are
sometimes arrested. Some overseas jurisdictions have
introduced a predominant aggressor test. The New
Zealand Police should do the same.
On the whole, the prosecution of domestic violence
offenders is far too reliant on victim testimony.
This means many men escape conviction as women fail
to give evidence as a result of intimidation or other
factors. In a self-perpetuating cycle, this discourages
police officers from making arrests in the first
place. It need not be so. Effective investigation
techniques should, in many cases, make it possible
to successfully prosecute offenders without victim
testimony. This would not only improve the accountability
of offenders. It would also signal that it is the
community, through the police, which is taking a
stand against violence, not (just) individual women.
The case studies include instances in which men
have been given police bail in contradiction to the
provisions of the Bail Act 2002 – and instances in
which women have been put in the invidious position
of having to tell police whether or not they want
the offender held in custody. The amendments we suggest
should address these problems. (Chapter 12.)
- THAT the New Zealand Police places much greater
priority on following up and charging respondents
who breach the non-contact provisions of their
protection order but have left the scene by the
time the patrol arrives, and that where there are
multiple offences, each is charged.
The case studies show many instances in which a
breach of a protection order has not been followed
up. This seriously undermines the message inherent
in the order – both to the offender, who learns that
breaching the order is consequence free, and to the
protected person, who often decides there is little
point in calling the police. (Chapter 12.)
- THAT, wherever possible, police officers completing
domestic violence risk assessments do so in consultation
with victims and that the results be made available
to them.
Significant advances have been made in understanding
risk factors in domestic violence. The New Zealand
Police is currently trialling several promising risk
assessment protocols. This is to be encouraged. However,
given that battered women’s views are the single
best predictor of further violence, it is crucial
that risk assessment is carried out in consultation
with them. In addition, we think women have a right
to the results of such assessments, which may help
those who underestimate the risks they face to make
a more realistic reassessment. (Chapter 12. See also
Chapter 7.)
- THAT the New Zealand Police:
- accelerates efforts to increase the ethnic,
cultural and linguistic diversity among police
recruits; and
- ensures District Commanders identify interpreters
on whom they can call to assist when dealing
with non-English speakers in their districts.
By and large, women in the Pasifika and other ethnic
minority streams faced particular barriers to receiving
an effective response from the police. This seemed
to reflect a mix of cultural, immigration and language
issues. We applaud efforts by the New Zealand Police
to recruit a greater diversity of women and men into
the service. This needs to be accompanied by the
provision of interpreters. (Chapter 12. See also
Chapters 14 and 15.)
- THAT the New Zealand Police substantially increases
the amount of pre-service and in-service training
in domestic, and ensures that such training pays
particular attention to helping police officers
understand the dynamics of family violence in diverse
cultural contexts.
As mentioned in relation to the courts, some of
the problems evident in policing reflect the fact
that too many police officers lack a good understanding
of domestic violence. This is particularly evident
in the minimisation of certain breaches of protection
orders as “technical”, and in the way some police
place women in the invidious position of making decisions
about the arrest and/or bail of their abusers. In
addition, few police seem to have a good understanding
of the particular barriers facing women from culturally
and linguistically diverse communities. (Chapter
12.)
- THAT the New Zealand Police places greater priority
on working in genuinely collaborative partnerships
with Women’s Refuges and other specialist domestic
violence organisations and negotiates with them;
- protocols for the provision of support to
victims of family violence;
- case-specific protocols for sharing information
which will help to hold offenders accountable
for their violence; and
- arrangements by which specialist domestic
violence community-based organisations can
participate in monitoring the response of the
police and other state institutions.
Many of the women reported that they were called
or visited by Women’s Refuge workers as a follow-up
to police attendance at a domestic violence incident.
This follow-up was often crucial to women getting
information about protection orders and other remedies
and support available to them. It was often the first
step in providing a seamless, community-wide response
to the battering of women. It also enabled the sort
of data sharing needed to monitor the response of
both state and community agencies. In turn, such
monitoring helps to ensure consistency, to identify
gaps and to plan remedial action. However, in some
centres, interagency collaboration is limited to
sharing more general information about policies,
practices and training opportunities and does not
include the sort of case-specific information needed
for effective monitoring. This needs to be addressed.
(Chapter 12. See also Chapter 15.)
Immigration Issues
- THAT the Victims of Domestic Violence Policy
be aligned with the Domestic Violence Act 1995
by including the interests of children as one of
the factors that must be considered when determining
whether a woman’s application for residence and/or
a work permit should be granted.
As one of our case studies graphically illustrates
(Amira), non-resident women can fall into a gap between
the roles and processes of the Family Court and Immigration
New Zealand respectively. That is, because their
abuser/sponsor withdraws support for their application
for residence, women may be forced to leave the country.
However, the same abuser/sponsor can get from the
Family Court an order preventing the removal of the
child(ren) from the country. Removing the mother
from the country is not in the interests of the child(ren)
because it is likely to result in further exposure
to the batterer and the loss of the relationship
vital to recovery from trauma. Allowing the interests
of children to be taken into account when considering
applications for residence under the special policies
for victims of domestic violence would address this
problem. (Chapter 14.)
- THAT immigration officers considering applications
for residence under the Victims of Domestic Violence
Policy be given powers to consider a wider range
of evidence in determining whether domestic violence
within the meaning of section 3 of the Domestic
Violence Act 1995 has occurred, but that the rules
be drafted to specifically exclude consideration
of information from the abuser.
Despite the recent revision of the policy, the evidential
requirements regarding domestic violence are quite
restrictive, especially when police respond to Immigration
New Zealand requests without fully understanding
what is required and the implications of their responses.
Giving immigration officers wider discretion would
help. (Chapter 14.)
- THAT when an application for residence under
the Victims of Domestic Violence Policy is being
considered, the woman’s own perception of her circumstances
should be the basis for the verification of evidence
in support of her claim of an inability to return
home, that her husband’s or partner’s views should
not be considered, and that the burden of proving
the general status of women in a society should
not depend exclusively on evidence provided by
the applicant.
The current test here is quite difficult. Essentially,
what is being required is independent evidence of
cultural practices and of events which have not yet
happened. Our analysis of certain Residence Review
Board decisions suggests that New Zealand–based officials
can make sweeping and ill-founded judgements about
conditions in the home country and that those judgements
may force women to return to dangerous and demeaning
circumstances. (Chapter 14.)
- THAT Immigration New Zealand works with relevant
migrant communities to:
- make information about the Victims of Domestic
Violence Policy available in a simple form
and in languages understood by the major immigrant
groups in New Zealand;
- ensure that such information is provided
to women when they arrive in New Zealand or
make an application for residence;
- distribute that information in places where
immigrant women are most likely to go; and
- ensure that orientation programmes for new
immigrants allocate time exclusively for women
where they are informed about the Policy as
well as other relevant New Zealand law and
services.
The special immigration policies for victims of
domestic violence seemed to be used surprisingly
infrequently. More promotion of them is needed. (Chapter
14.)
- THAT a clear statement should be included in
the Immigration New Zealand Operations manual to
the effect that the purpose of the Victims of Domestic
Violence Policy is to give effect to New Zealand’s
international obligation to end violence against
women.
In contrast to other special policies, the special
polices for victims of domestic violence do not have
a statement of their objective or purpose. Such a
statement would provide useful guidance to officers
faced with marginal or ambiguous cases. It would
also be helpful for women appealing against decisions
to decline applications for residence or work permits
if it could be shown that such decisions ran counter
to the purposes of the policies. (Chapter 14.)
Child, Youth and Family
- THAT Child, Youth and Family adopts risk assessment
protocols which:
- are consistent with the definition of domestic
violence in the Domestic Violence Act 1995,
especially section 3(3) where the victim of
the violence is not construed as having caused
the children to hear or see the abuse meted
out against her;
- require social workers to screen for domestic
violence; and
- require social workers, where domestic violence
is detected, to evaluate battered women’s parenting
in the context of the constraints imposed by
such violence.
Our case studies reflect a problem identified in
many countries, namely inconsistencies between the
approach of women’s advocates and child protection
workers. That is, child protection workers often
fail to identify domestic violence in the lives of
abused children, or, if they do identify such violence,
treat the non-violent parent as part of the problem
(an inadequate protector) rather than as part of
the solution. Such practices can mean the battered
mothers are unfairly held to account for events over
which they have no control. Good practice suggests
that, in general, the best hope for keeping children
safe is to work with their mothers to help them to
keep themselves safe – and their children. The methodology
of the current Risk Estimation System is part of
the problem. It needs to be modified. (Chapter 15.)
- THAT Child, Youth and Family places greater priority
on perpetrator accountability through the use of
restraining orders and the prosecution of perpetrators,
and works collaboratively with the police to ensure
the effective prosecution and enforcement of restraining
orders.
One aspect of the lack of coordination between child
advocacy and women’s advocacy is that, essentially,
women are held responsible for monitoring the behaviour
of the abuser. In fact, it needs to be the community
which takes this responsibility. The use of a restraining
order against the abuser is one mechanism by which
CYF could assume more direct responsibility for keeping
children safe and making abusers accountable for
their violence. (Chapter 15.)
- THAT Child, Youth and Family places greater priority
on working collaboratively with community agencies
which specialise in domestic violence work. This
must include working in partnership with such organisations
to assess cases, determine priorities and allocate
the follow-up of children exposed to domestic violence.
Good practice worldwide recognises that the best
results arise through coordinated intervention. Here,
we are suggesting that the statutory powers of CYF
are best reserved for the most serious cases where
urgent action is needed, not in less serious cases
where those powers can be perceived by battered women
as a threat. Triage arrangements in which cases are
allocated to community or statutory services depending
on risk and urgency can make better use of resources.
Some communities are implementing such arrangements.
We recommend extending them. (Chapter 15.)
- THAT social worker training, both pre-service
and in-service, pays greater attention to the dynamics
of domestic violence, the co-occurrence of violence
against children and women, the role of the state
in holding perpetrators accountable and the importance
of interagency collaboration.
As with other services, some of the problems we
have uncovered seem to reflect a lack of understanding
of the dynamics of domestic violence, the effects
of such violence on children and the constraints
under which battered women live their lives. Better
training is needed. (Chapter 15.)
Community and Non-Government Organisation sector
- THAT the New Zealand Police, the courts, Child,
Youth and Family, and the Department of Corrections
collaborate with specialist community-based domestic
violence agencies to plan and implement regular
safety audits of the state agencies’ handling of
domestic violence cases.
We think that the interagency approach now well
recognised as best practice needs to be strengthened.
It is important that this brings together state and
community agencies, and does so in genuinely collaborative
relationships which address imbalances of power between
state and community agencies. Moreover, community-based
agencies need to be recognised as key players in
driving the sort of safety audits which should be
become a regular feature of monitoring the performance
of state agencies. (Chapter 12. See also Chapter
15.)
- THAT counselling and generic social service agencies
adopt domestic violence screening and safety protocols
and ensure that only counsellors with training
in domestic violence work with perpetrators and
victims of domestic violence.
Finally, our case studies have revealed dangerous
practices of a range of social service and community
organisations, practices which often colluded with
the abuser and placed women and children in dangerous
situations. While most of these organisations are
not specialists in domestic violence work and should
not undertake such work unless they have properly
qualified staff, they are in a position to screen
for domestic violence and make appropriate referrals.
(Chapter 15.)
1This list was supplied by the Family Violence
Technical Advisory unit (PO Box 1219, Hamilton). Because
it was compiled from a search of newspapers, some domestic
violence deaths may have been overlooked.
2Re L (A Child) (Contact: Domestic Violence)[2001]
Fam Law 260.
3Police v Keenan (Palmerston North,
District Court, 25 November 1996).
4M v M [2002] NZFLR 743 (HC), Fisher
and Priestley JJ.
5Section 2 of the Evidence Act 2006 states: "This
Act comes into force on a date to be appointed by the
Governor-General by Order in Council; and 1 or more
Orders in Council may be made appointing different
dates for different provisions."
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